The US and the War in Ukraine
This blog explores the US's role in the war in Ukraine, and whether the US is deliberately dragging out the war or if bureaucratic constraints are to blame. It also looks at the US's attempts to talk Ukraine into giving up the goal of taking back Crimea.
Philippe Lemoine
I'm a PhD candidate in philosophy at Cornell. I'm also a research fellow at @CSPICenterOrg. I write about stuff. "At least he's pretty smart." (@bechhof)
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Many people think this is deliberate because the US wants to drag the war out, but I think it's wrong, that most people in the administration actually wish it could end quickly because it's a distraction from China, but political/bureaucratic constraints make aid very haphazard. https://t.co/nSFWvG7ee2
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
If the US really wanted to drag the war out to bleed Russia, US officials wouldn't try to talk Ukraine into giving up the goal of taking back Crimea, but according to the Wall Street Journal that's exactly what Sullivan did in Kiev last November. https://t.co/j64iYZj3x1
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
I think the people who make that inference make the same mistake as people on the opposite side of the spectrum who think it's inevitable that the war will end with a decisive Ukrainian victory because NATO's combined GDP is 20 times that of Russia and NATO stands behind Ukraine.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
The problem with that view is that GDP doesn't magically translate into military resources for Ukraine, those resources have to actually be committed and, because of those political/bureaucratic constraints, aid remains very limited and is only being ramped up very gradually.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
Although the official rhetoric sometimes makes it seem like US officials are fully on board with the maximalist pro-Ukraine position, there is plenty of evidence that it's not really true and that a wide range of views exists in the administration, which is reflected in policy.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
It's a mistake to think of the US government, or any other government for that matter, as a unitary actor. In particular, my sense is that a lot of people in the Pentagon, starting with Milley, are skeptical about the wisdom of the current policy and slowing things down.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
They have lots of ways to do that and it's difficult for the White House to completely ignore them. It's not impossible, but Biden/Sullivan and other people sitting on the NSC would have to be totally united behind the maximalist approach, which again doesn't seem to be the case.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
One of the ways the Pentagon can influence policy is that it's tasked to present the military options, because nobody else has the relevant expertise/data, which allows it to frame the options in a way that favors their preferred outcome. This has happened over and over again.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
For instance, at the beginning of the Clinton administration a lot of people in government wanted to intervene militarily in Bosnia, but the Pentagon was opposed to it and was able to block that policy by arguing that it would require a huge amount of US troops on the ground.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
I wouldn't be surprised if, for example, some people in the Biden administration wanted to deliver a lot more Bradleys and the Pentagon made it seem like it would be much more difficult than it really is because they don't think going all-in for Ukraine is in the US interest.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
If the rest of the administration were really committed to that policy, Biden could just call the Pentagon's bluff and order them to do it, but again it's clearly not the case and in practice many people are probably glad that the Pentagon is giving them cover to procrastinate.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
I'm just speculating here to illustrate concretely how the Pentagon could affect policy on Ukraine, but again when you read memoirs by former members of the US government, this sort of things happened over and over again and obviously it's not just the Pentagon that can do that.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
The bottom line is that it's a mistake to read a deliberate plan into policy output, because it's the result of a compromise between different factions in government and as a result it rarely has the kind of coherence that many people assume it does.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
Similarly, you may personally think that it's obviously in the West's interest to go all-in for Ukraine against Russia, but many people in government disagree even if this isn't reflected in the public debate for obvious reasons.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023 -
The fact that government is divided, together with political constraints, create limits on what the West can do to help Ukraine that, although different in nature, are just as real as GDP and industrial capacity. Any good analysis should take those limits into account.
— Philippe Lemoine (@phl43) March 31, 2023